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Les relations du travail en Corée en transition:
ﬂexibilité autoritaire?
Dae-oup Chang
Le but de cet article est d’examiner la signiﬁcation des changements
dans les relations de travail avant et après la crise économique au
regard des nouvelles formes émergentes de subordination des tra-
vailleurs au capital à travers diverses mesures de ﬂexiblilisation, cela
tant au niveau national qu’au sein des milieux de travail. La période
comprise entre 1987 et 1996 fut marquée, dans l’histoire du développe-
ment capitaliste coréen, par la confrontation entre le capital et le travail,
rapport qui s’est cristallisé dans la formation d’un « mouvement de syn-
dicats démocratiques » hautement politisé. Ce n’est qu’à partir de la
crise économique de 1997 que l’État capitaliste et les entrepreneurs
privés ont pu regagner un contrôle effectif sur le facteur travail en
soumettant ce dernier aux impératifs de la logique marchande. En
d’autres termes, c’est le marché du travail ﬂexiblilisé, basé sur une forte
compétitivité, qui détermine les mécanismes de gestion des ressources
humaines et qui a permis aux entrepreneurs de diluer, de façon effective,
le militantisme des syndicats sur le lieu de travail. Une étude de cas sur
les relations de travail dans l’entreprise Hyundai Motors Car a révélé
que, avec le degré grandissant de ﬂexibilité et d’insécurité au travail, les
relations de travail apparaissent maintenant sous une forme sub-
stantiellement différente. Cette forme de relation de travail n’est pas
simplement basée sur un contrôle coercisif de l’État sur le travail, mais
plus fondamentalement sur une subordination plus volontaire des tra-
vailleurs individuels au capital privé. Cependant, la marchandisation du
travail ﬂexiblilisé semble avoir une double-nature. Dans une tentative
pour institutionaliser le marché du travail ﬂexiblilisé, l’État joue un
double rôle, intégrant, d’une part, les syndicats dans un espace corpo-
ratiste, comme la Commision tripartite, et d’autre part, utilisant des
mesures autoritaires contre n’importe quelle violation du règlement
venant nuire à la ﬂexibilisation du marché du travail.
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Introduction 
During the “miraculous” development of capitalism in Korea,
labour relations were controlled unilaterally by corporations,
largely through military-like organizational structures and disci-
pline in the workplace. The reproduction of these labour relations
was based speciﬁcally on the suppression of the collective power
of the working class by the state. As a result of this particular set-
tlement, Korean capitalists in the 1960s and 1970s enjoyed
“miraculous” accumulation. However, this particular form of
labour relations in Korea has undergone a signiﬁcant transition
since the late 1970s. Increasing struggles of the working class,
mainly in the textile and garment industry, began to challenge the
speciﬁc form of labour relations through politicizing labour
problems. In spite of the continual attempts by the military gov-
ernments to regain control over the collective power of labour, the
upsurge of the trade union movement in 1987 showed that the
growing power of the working class could not be contained by the
traditional forms of labour control alone. The ten-year period
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between 1987 and 1996 was marked by the confrontation between
enterprise unions and individual capital at the workplace, on the
one hand, and between the state and organized labour at the
national level, on the other. It was not until the economic crisis of
1997 that the capitalist state and capital eventually appeared to
have regained their power to control labour. The new form of
labour relations is based not merely on the coercive control of
labour by the state, but, fundamentally, on the methods to subor-
dinate individual workers to individual capital. The aim of this
article is to examine the newly emerging forms of subordination
of workers to capital at the national as well as the workplace level. 
The Making of Korean Labour Relations 
The Nature of State-led Capitalist Development 
and Its Impact on Labour 
After the early formation of capitalist labour relations, in
which the Japanese colonial regime mobilized and directly con-
trolled labour largely through a “multifunctional police system”
(Cumings: 152), and the eradication of the working class
movement during the civil war (1950/53), capitalist labour rela-
tions in Korea have been reproduced through the repression of the
working class by the state. This speciﬁc way of reproducing
labour relations in favour of further capital accumulation clearly
appeared in the moments of the crisis and reproduction of labour
relations in Korea. This occurred most noticeably in the collision
of the working class with the U.S. military regime in the post-
liberation period, during the emergence of the military regime 
in 1961, and in the Yushin (restoration) constitution in 1972.2
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2 Unlike the U.S. occupation policies in Japan and Germany which encouraged the
trade union movement, the U.S. authority in Korea seems to have perceived, in light
of the increasing conﬂicts between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the Korean penin-
sula, the existence of a strong socialist labour movement as the most critical obstacle
for the establishment of an anti-communist capitalist society in South Korea. Hence,
the US authorities more directly attempted to reformulate social relations through
suppressing the radical labour movement by banning unions’ strike activity in
December 1945 and later the National Council of Korean Trade Union (Jeonpyeong)
itself. Also the U.S. authorities put all private property owned by Japanese capital
under the direct control of the U.S. authorities and thereby defeated the movement
of workers’ control launched by communist organizations in the aftermath of the lib-
eration. The state also tightened its control over the working class
The development of this speciﬁc form of labour regulation culmi-
nated in the 1970s when the Park regime tightened the state’s
control over collective labour through emergency decrees which
nullified all existing workers’ right by super-constitutional
measures. Under the auspices of the state, corporations exercised
unlimited authority in making managerial decisions through a
“military-like” organizational structure, a system of command and
discipline on the shop-ﬂoor (Rho: 42). In this regard, it appears as
if, as Deyo mentioned, this speciﬁc development of labour rela-
tions shows the absence of the social power of the working class
(Deyo, 1989).
In spite of its extreme class characteristics and its maximized
role in reproducing a speciﬁcally oppressive form of labour rela-
tions, the nature of the state appeared in the form of the subordi-
nation of individual capitalists to the authority of government,
rather than in the form of the subordination of the state to the cap-
italists. In contrast to the Rhee Syng-man’s government, which
had “immediate” alliances with particular domestic ﬁrms and fed
them by offering various privileges, the military regime, in the
aftermath of the military coup in 1961, excluded the capitalists
who had been allied with Rhee Syng-man’s government from
politics and then put all individual capitalists under the more
“institutionalized” control by nationalized banks and ﬁnancial
institutions. First of all, the Park government succeeded in monop-
olizing the authority to regulate ﬁnancial ﬂows in the aftermath of
the military coup. In order to control the domestic banks, the
military government conﬁscated the privately-held shares of the
domestic banks from individual capitalists (Haggard: 65). The
state also put the Bank of Korea under the control of the Ministry
of Finance. In addition, new state-owned banks, such as a
Medium Industry Bank and the National Agricultural Cooper-
atives Federation were established, while a new government orga-
nization, the Economic Planning Board, was set up as the
institutional basis of the selective promotion of industrial invest-
ment in which the state allocated foreign loans to some speciﬁc
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before the coming of heavy industrialization in the 1970s. In early 1970, legislation
on “the Extraordinary Law on Trade Unions and Labour Disputes Adjustment for
Foreign Invested Company” was introduced. According to the law, the establishment
of trade unions and their activities in the foreign invested ﬁrms must be under the
direct control of the state. 
individual capitalists satisfying the government-planned develop-
ment strategy. As a result, capitalist social relations in Korea were
arranged in such a way that “the political” regulated individual
capital as well as labour.3 In doing so, the state could appear as if
it was detached from the interest of the capitalist class, providing
the basis of the mystiﬁcation of the state to Western observers and
thereby contributing to the development of the theories of the so-
called developmental state. This particular arrangement of capi-
talist social relations, the maximized developmental leadership of
the state against individual capital, suppressive labour relations in
the workplace and the state’s coercive control over the collective
power of the working class, led to “miraculous” economic devel-
opment during the 1960s and 1970s. Showing a remarkable
average annual GDP growth rate of 8.45 per cent and 35.5 per
cent export growth between 1961 and 1970, Korea’s industrializa-
tion was successfully transformed from ISI (Import Substitute
Industrialization) to EOI (Export Oriented Industrialization).
During the same period, GNP per capita increased three times,
from $82 to $253.4 Industrial structure also changed dramatically
during the 1960s. The contribution of manufacturing and mining
to GDP increased from 11.6 per cent in 1961 to 21.6 percent in
1970. Accordingly, the number of manufacturing workers doubled
from 417,622 in 1960 to 995,981 in 1970 (Koo, 1990: 673).
However, the export-drive based on the expansion of foreign
borrowing resulted in an extremely high level of foreign debt, the
total of which increased from 200 million dollars in 1964 to 2.922
billion dollars in 1971 (Hart-Landsberg: 174-75). On the other
hand, although the export of consumer goods was increasing con-
tinually, this growth accompanied an increasing importation of the
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3 Those particularities of capitalist social relations, i.e., state control over individual
capitalists and the working class, in which the political appeared to be separated
from the capitalist class, on the one hand, and also appeared to be an agent of the
capitalist class, on the other, offered the contradictory basis for the state’s
“autonomy”, which has been theorized as the “developmental state”. However,
developmental state theory does not explain the nature of the state’s intervention in
the reproduction of capital relations. Rather, in developmental state theory, the nature
of the state’s intervention is captured by the relations between the state and private
business, on the one hand, and the state and labour, on the other hand, without regard
to the role of the state in reproducing the particularly articulated social relations of
production. 
4 All dollar ﬁgures represent US dollars.
means of production, the result of which appeared in the growing
trade deﬁcit: $574 million in 1967 to $1,045 million in 1971. As
global capital accumulation went into a slow-down period, newly
emerging protectionism in the advanced economies also threat-
ened further capital accumulation in Korea. In particular, after the
trade balance of the U.S. went into deﬁcit in 1971, light-industry-
based export appeared to have reached an impasse especially due
to the increasing protectionism in the U.S. market. Korea’s export
growth began to slow, after the peak of 42% growth in 1967, 37%
in 1969, 34% in 1970 and 28% in 1971. Park’s government
attempted to encourage exports and discourage imports by a
12.9% devaluation of the Korean won in June 1971. However,
devaluation appeared rather to result in increasing repayment
pressure on Korean ﬁrms that raised almost half of their external
funds from foreign borrowing. In order to release financial
pressure from foreign debt, individual capital rushed into the
informal curb market for short-term loans and, as a result, suffered
from the re-payment of high interest corporate debt to the informal
credit market. Because of these difﬁculties, “more than 2000 ﬁrms
were forced into bankruptcy by 1971” (Hart-Landsberg: 175). In
order to overcome these problems, the state directly intervened in
the economy by liquidating the less efﬁcient individual capital
from May 1969. As a result, 30 large and medium size companies
were forced to shut down by the government. In addition, the state
attempted to support relatively efﬁcient capital through “a devalu-
ation, a cut in domestic interest rate, and a bailout of ﬁnancially
troubled ﬁrms” (Amsden: 97). A gigantic bailout project was
implemented by the state in 1972, by “placing an immediate
moratorium on all loans in the informal credit markets and
reduced the bank loan rate from 23% to 15.5% annually” (Cho:
15). 
However, it was in heavy industrialization that the developed
role of the state in revitalizing capitalist development by control-
ling labour and ﬁnancial ﬂows showed its culmination. The state,
beginning with President Park’s public announcement of the
Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan in 1973, attempted to push
heavy industrialization through direct funding, allocating foreign
loans, lowering interest rates and offering incentives and tax-cuts.
Foreign and domestic loans were highly selectively allocated to
heavy and chemical industries through the so-called policy-based
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lending by the nationalized banks throughout the mid and late
1970s. Given the economic development of the 1970s, it seems
that heavy industrialization was successful at least in offering a
further basis of accumulation for Korean capital. In the 1970s,
despite a slight slow-down during the mid 1970s caused by the
ﬁrst oil shock, the economic growth was impressive. After the ﬁrst
oil shock, the economic growth rate soon recovered, showing an
average of 12.33% growth from 1976 to 1978. Capital investment
concentrated on the heavy industries appeared profitable.
Electronics, steel, shipbuilding and other assembling-manufactur-
ing industries enjoyed price competitiveness in the global market,
leading to export growth of heavy industrial products. Heavy
industrialization also could substitute the production of the small-
scale means of production. The rate of imported general machin-
ery to the total supply of general machinery fell from 75.3% in
1970 to 59% in 1980 and 41.3% in 1985 (Lim: 30). In addition,
the construction boom in the Middle East and the Vietnam War
contributed to the growth. As a result of accelerated development
during the 1970s, Korea became a fully industrialized country
with the manufacturing and mining sectors producing more than
30% of GDP. 
The planned heavy industrialization from the early 1970s, in
which the state maximized its control over individual capital by
establishing funds and channelling them into pre-designed projects
and sectors, on the one hand, and by tightening its control over
labour through the subsequent national emergency decrees that
illegalized workers’ collective actions, on the other, showed once
again that successful state-led capital accumulation could be
achieved. However, it is not the case that the state’s control of the
working class has always succeeded in reproducing “military-like”
labour control on the shop-ﬂoor. Rather, these strategies resulted
in the massive politicization of labour struggles. Noticeably, the
“barracks-like” labour control on the shop-ﬂoor has been under-
mined by the emergence of a democratic trade union movement
against the pro-government FKTU (Federation of Korean Trade
Unions). In 1979, the development of the democratic trade union
movement, which was represented by the intense struggles in the
textile industry, e.g., the Dongil Textile Company in the mid-
1970s and the self-immolation of a textile worker, Jun Tail in
1970, culminated in the YH workers’ struggle. The violent sup-
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pression of the YH worker’s struggle precipitated a nationwide
political campaign that led ﬁnally to the overthrow of President
Park (Ogle: 92; Cumings: 79). After President Park’s assassina-
tion, nation-wide demonstrations demanding political democrati-
zation were held. In addition, over 700 strikes and 897 conﬂicts –
which amounted to the same total number of all labour conﬂicts
as in the 1970s – were dramatically organized by workers in a few
months during the spring of 1980. After another military coup by
Chun Doo-hwan, the government tightened control over labour by
sending union leaders to concentration camps, strengthening the
mediating role of the state in labour conﬂicts, removing the closed
shop and prohibiting third party interventions in labour conﬂicts
to preclude further involvement of religious groups and students
in the labour movement. However, independent trade unions,
struggling against the state’s labour control and the leadership of
the FKTU, have continually emerged throughout the 1980s.5
Deepening Crisis of Reproduction 
and Labour Relations in Transition
In 1987, the workers’ struggle at last critically undermined
this speciﬁc form of labour control both by the state and employ-
ers. The signiﬁcant challenge from democratic trade unions ﬁrstly
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5 Two struggles in the mid-1980s, the strikes at Daewoo Motors and at Kuro
Industrial Park, represented the continuing development of the workers’ struggle and
its continuity with that of the 1970s. The struggle at Daewoo Motors showed the
emerging possibility of the development of struggle in what was the most heavily
invested sector. In fact, this struggle exempliﬁed the extremely militant struggle by
male workers in the sectors in heavy industry, which came to dominate workers’
struggle after 1987. The so-called “disguised” workers’ (who became manual
workers after graduating from college in order to organize workers into unions)
attempts to radicalize trade unions played an important role in organizing the strike,
showing a great degree of solidarity with the “real” workers. Also, in the process of
the strike, the struggle of rank and ﬁle workers, who organized and supported the
“Committee for Normalization of Trade Union”, went beyond the pro-capitalist
unions’ leadership as well as legal boundaries. This indicated the steep development
of the radical trade union movement throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. On
the other hand, the Kuro solidarity strikes, supported by student and dissident orga-
nizations, showed the continual development of the struggle in small and medium
size ﬁrms which were centered in the textile industry during the 1970s. It also
showed the possibility of an alternative current in the trade union movement against
the existing pro-capitalist federation, FKTU, by developing regional solidarity to a
great extent.
appeared in the increasing number of unions and union members.
Between 1986 and 1989, the number of unions increased from
2,658 to 7,883 and of individual members from 1,036,000 to
1,932,000 (Koo, 2000: 231). With the increasing number of
unions and membership, union density also increased from 12.3
per cent to 18.6 per cent in the same period (Park and Leggett:
279). However, it is more important to see the signiﬁcance of the
qualitative changes in labour relations. Reﬂecting the democratic
nature of the newly established unions, the annual average number
of industrial disputes for the decade from 1987 increased about
ﬁve times in comparison with that for the decade before 1987.
Between 1977 and 1986, there were 174 disputes per year, while
in the period 1987-1996 the number was 846 per year (Koo, 2000:
231). Engaged in these industrial disputes, democratic trade
unions changed the nature of labour relations on the shop-ﬂoor by
encroaching into the managerial decision-making process with
regard to “discharge, discipline and transfer”, enhancing union
delegates’ dominance over the shop-ﬂoor and making collective
bargaining into a necessary procedure that managerial authorities
had to deal with in order to put the worker in the production line
(Jeong: 60). On the other hand, “by confronting unprecedented
workforce militancy, the state has increasingly lost control over
the labour market as well as trade union since 1987” (Lee et al.:
140). As the state could not stop the continual emergence of inde-
pendent unions and individual capitalists had no measures to cope
with the individual workers, the cost of labour began to increase.
During the four years (1983-1986) before the 1987’s workers
struggle, wages in manufacturing showed a stable increase of
8.95%. However, after 1987, wages increase in manufacturing
began to be accelerated, recording 10.4% in 1987, 16.4% in 1988,
20% in 1989 and 16.8% in 1990. In addition, working hours
decreased from 51.9 per week in 1987 to 47.5 in 1993, without
decrease either in the workforce or in real wage.
The other aspect of the particular arrangement of capitalist
production also began to show symptoms of being undermined:
the state seemed no longer to be able to sustain its strong leader-
ship against individual capital. In an attempt to overcome the
crisis of capitalist development between 1979 and 1981, individ-
ual capitalists, noticeably the Korean chaebols, based on their
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growing domination over the national economy, began to push
forward the agenda of ﬁnancial liberalization in order to get easier
access to national as well as international ﬁnancial resources (Suh:
133-34). It was from the early 1980s that the state began to loose
control over ﬁnancial ﬂows, evidenced by its “privatizing the
state-owned commercial banks”, allowing the establishment of
new non-banking private ﬁnancial institutions, amending the
bank-law and gradually liberalizing the interest rate (Haggard and
Moon: 84). At the same time, the regulation of foreign banks and
the commodity market also began to be relaxed in response to
global pressure, particularly from the U.S. These liberalization
policies show the declining overall role of the state in reproducing
capitalist social relations. The boom between 1987 and 1989,
which was based on the three “lows” (low oil prices, the low
Korean won and low international interest rates), left a massive
proﬁt in exports, brought a massive current account surplus ($46.1
billion in 1986, $98.6 billion in 1987, $141.7 billion in 1988 and
$50.6 billion in 1989) and, therefore, helped to sustain Korean
capitalist development, in spite of the worsening relations between
capital and labour and growing competitive pressure in the world
markets. However, this did not mean that the boom resolved the
development of the crisis of the early arrangement of capitalist
social relations. 
Korean capital faced, from late 1989, increasing competitive
pressure in global markets. This increasing competitive pressure
was particularly critical because Korean ﬁrms had invested a huge
amount of capital in order to increase production during the boom.
Increasing pressure in the market appeared in diverse forms;
increasing competition with the newly industrialized nations
(NICs) and subsequently China, growing protectionism in devel-
oped countries, particularly in the U.S., and “the upward revalua-
tion of the South Korean won by almost 16% in 1988”
(Hart-Lansberg: 237-38). All of this resulted in a declining rate of
export growth, from 36.4% in 1987 to 3.0% in 1989. Korean
capital’s attempt to overcome these barriers was made primarily
in two ways; ﬁrstly, by introducing new means of production and
automation in order to compensate for increasing labour costs and
disputes; and, secondly, by changing the nature of exports in order
to avoid the trade conﬂicts, particularly by making more capital
19
investment in hi-tech industries.6 However, in spite of these
attempts, Korean ﬁrms’ ratio of net proﬁt to sales was merely an
average 1.2% during the period between 1990 and 1993 (Song:
267). This meant that further investment was possible only
through massive credit expansion based on foreign-loans through
various ﬁnancial institutions. Therefore, liberalization was again
accelerated in the 1990s by the Kim Young-sam government. In
the pursuit of Segehwa (globalization) policies, the government
allowed the establishment of merchant banking companies and
private short-term investment companies, and practically aban-
doned control over the exchange rate and investment co-ordina-
tion which had been a central feature of the selective promotion
of industries (Chang, 1998: 226-27). This resulted in a steep
increase in foreign loans, showing a particularly high dependency
on short-term loans, by 53.4 per cent in 1994. On top of this, the
low yen, which followed from the agreement between the U.S. and
Japan in 1995, worsened Korean ﬁrms’ ratio of net proﬁt to sales
in 1996 to a mere 0.5 per cent (Lee, 1999: 123). It was at this time
that the dependence of capital investment on foreign loans, which
grew from $31.7 billion in 1990 to $104.7 billion in 1996 with a
high dependence on short-term loans, reached a critical point.
Labour in the Deepening Crisis
Measures to Regain Control over Labour
The state’s ﬁrst aggressive attempt to regain its control over
unions since 1987 appeared in the presidential veto of the
amended labour law, which was meant to allow a certain degree
of freedom of union activities. Afterwards, authoritarian measures
to stabilize labour relations were widely re-deployed through uti-
lizing the police force, intelligence agencies and even the military.
All of this was exempliﬁed in the way in which the state dealt
with workers’ strikes in Pungsan Metal Industry and Hyundai
Heavy Industries in 1989. On the other hand, the government also
launched a range of quasi-corporatist measures to restructure
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6 Therefore, investment in ﬁxed capital, unlike in the boom of the mid-1980s,
appeared to be focused primarily on investment in introducing new products, the
automation of the labour process and R&D rather than on quantitative expansion of
equipment. The ratio of quantitative expansion to the total investment in plant and
equipment fell from 57.3 per cent in 1987 to 37.6 per cent in 1990.
labour relations. Firstly, the state implemented income policies,
not through the unilateral “wage guide-lines”, which had been
used by the former military governments, but through a form of
social contract between labour and capital. As a result, social wage
contracts between the FKTU and the KBF (Korean Businessmen
Federation) were introduced in 1993 and 1994. However, the
social contract policy was soon abandoned since “many compa-
nies and enterprise unions ignored the target or circumvented them
by restricting their application only to the basic salary, but not
observing them for the bonus or other special allowances”
(OECD: 58). Instead, the FKTU and the KBF together announced
a declaration for industrial peace in 1995, “promising co-opera-
tion for national economic development”. 
The state also pursued the ﬂexibility of labour, which was
believed to be one of the critical methods for overcoming the
declining competitiveness of exports, by amending labour laws in
the early 1990s. Initiated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
the discussion about labour law reform was focused on enhancing
the ﬂexibility of hiring, dismissing, and scheduling labour forces
through allowing the dispatch of workers, the hiring of scab labour
during industrial conﬂicts and the introduction of ﬂexible working
hours, while at the same time introducing more strict restrictions
on unions’ collective actions. It was at this time that Korean
chaebols introduced the methods of human resource management,
e.g., a merit-based wage and promotion system and the rational-
ization of workplace organization (Kim and Moon: 57). These
new forms of workplace labour regulation were widely spread,
especially in the electronics industry, e.g., at Goldstar, Daewoo
Electronics, and Samsung SDI, where new means of production
and labour-saving factory automation were introduced. The
attempts of the state and capital to enhance the ﬂexibility of labour
reﬂected on the revision of labour law proposed by the Ministry
of Labour in 1991. Not surprisingly, the revision faced workers’
strong opposition. After the unions’ struggles established the
“Joint Committee for ILO Issues and Labour Law Reform”, the
proposal was forced to be withdrawn. Furthermore, the Council of
Korean Trade Unions was ﬁnally established in January 1990.
This confederation represented the democratic trade union
movement, as opposed to the “yellow” trade unionism of the
Federation of Korea Trade Unions. Later, in 1995, CKTU devel-
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oped into the ﬁrst nation-wide independent national confederation,
the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). In the mid
1990s, all aspects of the particular capitalist development in
Korea, namely unilateral labour relations at the workplace, state
control over collective labour, and state leadership against indi-
vidual capitalists, were defunct.
Emergence of the General Crisis
President Kim Young-sam announced the “New Thought on
Industrial Relations For Leaping into the First Class Nation in the
21st Century”, as the bridgehead for reviewing labour law in April
1996. This announcement was followed by the establishment of
“the Commission for Reform of Industrial Relations”. This was
the ﬁrst Tripartite Commission in which democratic trade unions
were allowed to participate. The discourse about the labour law
reform was focused on the fair “exchange” between relaxing
control over trade unions by improving collective labour law to
the internationally recognized level (i.e., removing the prohibition
of multiple trade unions, the prohibition of unionization by
teachers and public servants and the prohibition of political
activity of unions) and allowing a more ﬂexible labour market by
loosening the “rigid” labour standards law (Lee, 2000: 6).
However, in spite of months-long discussion about reform in the
Tripartite Commission, the bill proposed by the government in
December 1996 “accommodated almost all the demands” from
employers, “while giving only minor concessions to labour” such
as “allowing multiple unions at the national and industry level but
not at the enterprise level, and granting collective bargaining
rights to school teachers starting from 1999” (Koo, 2000: 238).
Even worse, the essence of labour law reform was revealed when
the law was enacted through a secret session at the National
Assembly, in the absence of the members of opposition parties, in
the early morning of 26 December. The enacted law was full of
the employers’ demands without any evidence that the state’s
forceful control over collective labour was to be relaxed. In fact,
the legislation legalizing the KCTU was postponed until 2000 and
the right for school teachers to unionize was completely denied. 
This provoked the ﬁrst nation-wide general strike in Korea.
On 26 December 1996, 143,695 workers from the KCTU and
70,000 workers of the GFHTU (General Federation of Hyundai
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Company Trade Unions) joined the strike. Thousands of unionists,
citizens and students held rallies in Seoul. Meanwhile, workers
from public transportation, hospitals, carmakers, shipyards and
textile factories subsequently joined the strike. Also, even the pro-
government FKTU organised a walkout by 156,000 workers at
486 work-sites. Again, from 3 January 1997, 230,000 workers
joined the second stage of the nation-wide strike. In the third stage
of the strike from 15 to 19 January, a total of 350,000 workers
joined the protest. This strike continued until 10 March. As a
result, the labour law was returned to the National Assembly and
amended in March, only this time partly reﬂecting the negotiations
in the Tripartite Commission. Lawmakers removed the anti-trade
union elements within the collective labour law, allowing multiple
trade unions at national and industrial level, but with a ﬁve-year
moratorium at company level, and allowing political activity by
unions. However, the new law also allowed more ﬂexibility of
labour through legalising ﬂexible working hours arrangements,
redundancy dismissals (although this was not to be enacted for
two years after the passing of the act) and allowing capital to hire
scab labour during labour disputes. This reform was expected to
revitalise Korea’s crisis-ridden capitalist development by opening
a new form of industrial relations. 
However, before the newly enacted law came into effect,
Korea’s capitalist development had ﬁnally begun to reveal its
limit. The continued expansion of credit during the early 1990s
resulted only in accelerated overproduction without overcoming
the barriers of the market. The emerging symptom of the tendency
to overproduction began to appear more concretely and severely
when the export of semi-conductors, which occupied 17.7 per cent
of total exports in 1995, collapsed with a dramatic fall in unit
prices in 1996, worsening the ﬁnancial pressure on Korean capital
(Bernard: 197). The crisis began with the bankruptcy of Hanbo
Steel, the fourteenth largest company in Korea, from January
1997. On top of this, ﬁnancial turmoil in Asia contributed to make
the general crisis more dramatic. While Korean banks and ﬁnan-
cial institutions attempted to recover their losses in the collapsed
Korean ﬁrms as well as in the deeply troubled ﬁnancial markets in
South East Asia by withdrawing further loans, foreign ﬁnancial
institutions began to refuse the roll over of the short-terms loans
in Asia. With the massive increase in demand for the dollar in the
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foreign currency market, a foreign currency crisis followed, pre-
cipitating a massive liquidation of capital. The stock price, which
had reached its highest level of 1,027.4 in the Korean Composite
Stock Price Index in late 1994, fell to 350.68 in late 1997. At last,
a general crisis occurred in Korea in late 1997.
Labour Movement in Dilemma after the Economic Crisis:
The Case of Hyundai Motors Car Workers Union 
Strike In and Against the General Crisis
By June 1997, many large chaebols (Korean big conglomer-
ates), such as Sami, Jinro, Daenong, Hansin, had already col-
lapsed. This sequence of bankruptcies reached a peak when KIA,
the 8th largest chaebol, collapsed. Afterwards, Ssangbanul, Haitai
and NewCore, all of which were among the thirty largest
chaebols, were also declared bankrupt. As banks and other ﬁnan-
cial institutions asked corporations to repay their credit in order to
compensate for losses in the collapsed ﬁrms, ﬁnancial pressure on
individual ﬁrms snowballed and drove many other ﬁrms into
bankruptcy. In other words, a general crisis emerged in Korea.7 In
the development of the crisis, trade unions faced a problem distin-
guished from the one they had struggled against previously. Most
noticeably, job insecurity increased quickly. In many cases, enter-
prise unions felt they had no option but to accept a wage freeze as
the trade-off for job security. Unions gave up collective bargain-
ing and declared no-strike agreements with their employers in a
vain attempt to maintain jobs. Also, the KCTU could not organize
effective resistance against the increasing job instability and ﬂex-
ibility strategies which were enhancing capitalists’ power of reor-
ganizing labour at the workplace. Instead, at this time, the KCTU,
shocked by the scale of the ﬁrst general crisis of Korean capital-
ist development, was pursuing an agenda for nationalist social
reform, particularly reform of chaebols, in order to save the
Korean economy.8
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7 To talk about the unfolding of the crisis in depth is not an aim of this article. In
another article, I argue that the Korean crisis must be understood as an expression
of the crisis of the reproduction of capital relations in Korea, which had been formed
in the national development of class struggle in the context of global capital accu-
mulation. See Chang, D. (2002). 
8 This patriotic unionism appeared in different forms, i.e., “business-ﬁrst-unionism”
when KIA went into bankruptcy and the management threatened to lay-off
The nationalist agenda of the unions was quickly taken advan-
tage of by the newly established Kim Dae-jung government,
which proposed to establish a co-operative body made up of
labour, business and government and called for national unity in
order to save the nation. The KCTU decided to take part in the
Tripartite Commission after Kim’s government reached an agree-
ment on chaebol reforms with the top four chaebols on
13 January. After about a month of discussion, the three parties in
the commission declared the “Social Agreement to Overcome the
Economic Crisis”. This “February Agreement” covered all major
areas of reform, such as of the corporate, public and ﬁnancial
sectors and the labour market. The outcome of the negotiation,
however, was controversial. Through this agreement, the govern-
ment and employers pledged to resolve the problems of chaebols
through 1) enhancing “transparency” in management of chaebols
by introducing mandatory consolidated ﬁnancial statements for
chaebols, 2) strengthening the ﬁnancial structure of chaebols by
banning cross-debt guarantees between subsidiaries within
chaebols, 3) strengthening responsible management; and
4) enhancing competitiveness by avoiding competitive investment
in over-heated industries and concentrating the major industry of
each chaebol (KCTU: 172-83). In terms of labour reforms, trade
unions allowed the earlier and easier implementation of redun-
dancy lay-offs by removing the provision of a two-year morato-
rium and relaxing the terms and conditions of “managerial needs”
that could legitimately necessitate redundancy lay-offs.
Furthermore, unions permitted the operation of temporary-work
agencies for the ﬂexible utilization of labour. As trade-offs, the
government pledged to build up a ﬁrmer social safety-net by
developing efﬁcient employment and health insurance and a
national pension system. Also the government legalized the
teachers’ union, removed the ban on unions’ political activity, and
allowed the unionization of public servants under the condition of
not exercising their right to take collective action (KCTU: 180).
This agreement gave the unions signiﬁcantly improved legal
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thousands of workers. Through the “campaign for saving KIA”, unions in KIA strove
to save the company by collecting contributions among workers and returning
bonuses and allowances. The KCTU also took part in the campaign for saving KIA,
arguing that KIA, the healthy national company, must be protected from the other
corrupted chaebols and foreign capital.
rights. Indeed, it appeared to meet the KCTU’s requirement on the
reforms of chaebols. Therefore, it seemed that labour had eventu-
ally achieved a fair exchange and this agreement “was welcomed
and praised as a historic compromise both inside and outside the
country” (Koo, 2001: 202). However, the most problematic nature
of this agreement is that unions provided capital with a social jus-
tiﬁcation for introducing greater ﬂexibility. The following devel-
opment of labour relations on the shop-floor show that the
exchange was by no means equitable in nature. 
After the institutionalization of the measures to enhance the
flexibility of labour in 1998, it was the struggle of Hyundai
Motors Workers Union (HMWU) that appeared as “a microcosm
of the more general conﬂicts between labour and capital” (Neary:
1). Even before this struggle the dynamic labour relations in
Hyundai Motors had been the catalyst for the development of
labour relations in Korea since 1987, representing both the “mirac-
ulous” accumulation of capital and the notorious military-like
labour control at the workplace. But this strike had its own special
signiﬁcance: it was an experimental struggle between the new
measures of management based on the institutionalization of the
ﬂexible labour market and the union’s possible aggressive strategy
for the renewal of it’s workplace domination. In 1997, the tensions
between capital and labour were increasing in Hyundai Motors
Car. While management had already been threatening to imple-
ment a massive employment adjustment scheme since the onset of
the economic crisis in 1997, workers elected a new union leader-
ship from a militant workplace organization called the
“Committee for Democratic Struggle”. The main slogan of the
union was “Not a Single Lay-off”. 
Although Hyundai management dismissed 2,380 workers
through voluntary retirement with little compensation in early
1998, the union’s initial response was relatively moderate. The
HMWU suggested working hour adjustments as an alternative to
mass lay-off (HMWU, 1998: 8). However, management informed
the union of its plan for laying-off 8,189 workers on 19 May and
dismissed 1,423 workers through the second voluntary retirement
scheme by 20 May. While the management kept refusing to talk
about the matter of employment adjustment with the union, the
HMWU instigated a two-day strike on 27 May. Meanwhile the
KCTU, a new leadership of which had decided not to join the
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Tripartite Commission and to devote itself to mobilizing nation-
wide resistance against lay-offs, changed its policy and once again
participated in discussions with the Commission on 10 June after
the unsuccessful General Strike in May. This decision to join the
Commission meant in practice that the KCTU abandoned nation-
wide struggles against the mass lay-offs. This certainly isolated
the HMWU and left the impression that the nation-wide resistance
to the lay-offs, declared by the KCTU, was more rhetorical than
real (Neary: 4). 
On 29 June 1998, Hyundai management ofﬁcially reported to
the Ministry of Labour its plan to lay-off 4,830 workers. The
response by the HMWU was to organize a limited strike, while
management pushed their third voluntary retirement scheme. As a
result, 1,252 workers choose to retire with fringe compensations.
On 16 July 1998, in spite of the union’s last suggestion that they
would accept wage cuts of over 30 per cent and unpaid vacation
in rotation, Hyundai at last laid off 2,678 workers and forced 900
workers to take a two-year unpaid vacation. The HMWU imme-
diately called for a general strike. With strong support from the
union membership, the President of the HMWU, Kim Kwang-Sik,
declared that they would not accept a single lay-off. Supported by
3,000 workers occupying the Hyundai Motors Car factory in
Ulsan, a chimney protest began by three former presidents of the
union. More than 7,000 workers’ families began to live in
makeshift tents beneath the smoke-stack in protest (Neary: 3). In
the meantime, management allowed some laid-off workers to
accept voluntary retirement and conﬁrmed that 1,569 workers
would be laid off on 31 July. On 14 August, they shut down the
factory. 
The government recognized the importance of this event and
entered into negotiations with management and the union. At the
same time, the government was preparing to use police force to
stop the strike before other unions got ready for solidarity strikes.
Whilst the negotiation was going on, the heavily industrialized
city of Ulsan became a police town with thousands of riot police
on the streets and blocking the factory gates. Outside the factory
on 17 August over 10,000 riot policemen tried to regain control
over the factory. On the same day that the riot police attempted to
enter the factory, 17 August, the Minister of Labour came to Ulsan
and attempted to mediate between management and the union.
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After a few days, negotiations were resumed and both parties
reached an agreement on the size of the lay-offs. On 24 August,
both parties held a press conference and announced “an agreement
for employment adjustment and management-employee
harmony”. The Union accepted 277 workers’ lay-offs and one and
one-half year’s unpaid vacation for 1,261 workers under the con-
dition of consolation bonuses for those who had been laid off. The
company promised its best effort to re-employ the dismissed
workers in HMC and other Hyundai ﬁrms (HMWU and HMC,
1998). This compromise solution created a real dilemma for the
union leadership as Kim Kwang-Sik, the President of the HMWU,
expressed:
The three days I spent on making the ﬁnal decision to accept the
lay-offs were the most painful days of my life. I feel as if I have
lived half of my life since then… I had run the HMWU, based
on a firm determination that not a single lay-off can be
accepted. However, the reality was cruel. It was extremely dif-
ﬁcult for a mere enterprise union to halt the lay-offs, which
were being pushed by both capital and the state. All that the
550,000 KCTU members achieved, even after a nation-wide
general strike for 20 days, was merely a two year moratorium
of the implementation of lay-offs. So I decided to let the
company have a formal victory and to take what I thought was
the best offer for my union members (Kim, 1998: 161-62).
In spite of its success in minimizing the size of the lay-offs,
the compromise agreement by the union, which had initially
promised not to accept a single lay-off, disappointed workers who
had been on strike for more than a month. The workers rejected
the agreement by a majority of 64% in a referendum on the agree-
ment (Neary: 5). However, the workers’ decision could not make
any difference. The strike was over. Immediately after the agree-
ment was signed, 15 trade union leaders were arrested and impris-
oned. Management now began quickly to reorganize the
workplace, taking advantage of the absence of the trade union
leadership as well as other militant union members who were
targeted for the redundancies and non-paid vacation by the man-
agement. A worker describes the changes at the workplace in the
aftermath of the struggle:
After the agreement, the workplace is changing signiﬁcantly…
in the past, management could rearrange labour only after con-
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sulting with the union. This time however, management did it
unilaterally. Also UPH (Unit Per Hour) is increasing seriously.
This was also possible through negotiation with union dele-
gates. But, now they (management) just enforced it with no dis-
cussion. The company now plans to increase the real working
hour per unit hour from 65% to 86%. But in reality it is now
90%. Intensity of labour has increased approximately one and
half times so far. (Kang: 115-16) 
Although HMWU succeeded in minimizing the lay-offs, the
negative inﬂuence of this strike for the Korean trade unions was
signiﬁcant. Allowing the ﬁrst “ofﬁcially” implemented structural
adjustment through mass dismissal, the result of the strike publi-
cized the necessity of a structural adjustment through a policy of
lay-offs both to other unions and individual capitalists. Now lay-
offs and other measures of ﬂexibility were justiﬁed and a national
“consensus” was ﬁrmly constituted: the struggle against ﬂexibil-
ity and structural adjustment is irrational and harmful to the
Korean economy.
The Transformation of Workplace Labour Relations 
After the Strike
After the strike, Jeong Kap-deuk, who was a former President
from 1996 to 1997, was again elected under the slogan of “labour
movement with citizens” and “accommodation with company”,
and with a promise of the union’s co-operation for higher produc-
tivity as a trade-off for better employment stability, in the absence
of militant union activists. It appeared as if the new union leader-
ship had achieved better stability of employment, including the re-
employment of dismissed workers. However, the relative stability
of employment which “regular” workers in Hyundai had was, in
fact, based upon a massive increase in the employment of irregu-
lar workers through in-company-subcontract ﬁrms. At this time
there are more than three in-company-subcontract ﬁrms providing
subcontract workers on each production line (Interview with
Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002). Normally con-
tracted for six to twelve months with small ﬁrms, which are again
contracted with Hyundai, more than 10,000 irregular workers are
working in Hyundai Motors Car. Many of these irregular workers
are usually located in so-called “avoided” parts of the production
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process, where industrial accidents are more likely to happen
(Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002).
Functioning as a “cushion” between the union’s attempt to secure
existing jobs and the company’s attempt to take advantage of
ﬂexible employment, irregular workers have already become a
necessary part of labour relations in Hyundai (Interview with
Hyundai Motors Workers, no.1, 19 June 2002). Given the merit of
having a cushion that could minimize the impact of ﬂexibility of
labour on its members, the trade union tends to hesitate to be
engaged, at least implicitly, in attempts to organize those subcon-
tracted workers. The increasing number of irregular workers also
constitutes a new form of hierarchy between regular and irregu-
lar workers. In accordance with technological development, such
as modularization and platform uniﬁcation, by which a signiﬁcant
part of the labour force can be re-organized and subcontracted,
further employment adjustment also seems inevitable. HMC plans
to decrease 21 platforms to seven uniﬁed platforms by 2005
(HMWU, 2000: 4). Also according to its modularization plan,
over 800 ﬁrms supplying parts will be reduced to 200 (KMWF:
22). These structural adjustment plans, together with intensiﬁed
labour, will create redundant labour and it is likely that those
redundant workers will be irregularized as in-company-subcon-
tract workers in a more vulnerable condition. Also, labour short-
ages are likely to be supplemented by the employment of more
irregular workers. 
The mass dismissal of labour at the Hyundai Motor Company
also contributed to taming militant union activists. Union activists
who returned to work after one and one-half years non-paid
vacation had to promise, in order that they be re-employed, not to
cause further industrial disputes and do their best for the develop-
ment of Hyundai (HMWU, 1999). Many of them found it difﬁcult
to be actively re-engaged in union activities because of the fear
that they would not be re-employed (Interview with Hyundai
Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002). Union delegates increas-
ingly tend to compromise with managerial decisions, avoiding
trouble “as far as it is not necessary” (Interview with Hyundai
Motors Workers, no.1, 19 June 2002). Employers’ strategies
toward union delegates are also changing. Now, rather than merely
ignoring the representativeness of the delegates on the production
line, managers give privileges to the more cooperative delegates
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with regard to work-schedules and the allocation of work
(Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002).
On some occasions, workers on a production line who are seen to
demonstrate good attitudes towards the management are given
privileges, such as less UPH (Unit Per Hour). This again would
attract more workers’ votes for those non-militant delegates in
union elections. The declining inﬂuence of the union over the
shop-ﬂoor enabled the management to tighten workplace disci-
pline easily. In HMC Chunjoo factory, a card system, by which
managers can trace every single movement of individual workers
in the factory thanks to ADC (Automated Data Collection) tech-
nology, was introduced (Kang: 105). On many occasions, workers
cannot leave the production line without permission. A worker
who was re-employed in a Hyundai branch ﬁrm, Hyundai Mobis,
describes this change:
In this workplace, workers cannot walk around in groups during
working hours or even during a break. All workers should be in
exactly the same uniforms without exception. Smoking is pro-
hibited and we cannot even imagine having a cup of coffee on
the way back from the toilet. We cannot do anything but work. I
feel as if even my imagination is being supervised. According
to a fellow worker, it became worse after the struggle in HMC
ended up with a ghastly defeat when the workers in this work-
place are now like slaves. Those working in the Hyundai
Galloper factory are in a condition of slavery. They do whatever
the management tells them to do, no matter what it is… a
worker working next to me worked 460 hours a month. I asked
him how could he manage to work this much. Then he said,
“The education allowance for my son was cut by half. I have to
earn money now since I don’t know when I would be ﬁred.
Hey, you just do what they want you to do. Otherwise, they will
send you somewhere else (Kang: 33). 
Taking advantage of the declining dominance of militant
unionists, the management has pushed forward new working
arrangements under a program known as “WIN 21”. This program
was ﬁrst launched by the management in 1997 as a new labour
regulation strategy, but had often been nulliﬁed by union delegates
at the workplace. It was now being reintroduced as an effective
method to change workplace labour relations in the absence of the
union’s intervention. One of the main aims of WIN 21 was to
increase the foremen’s authority in managing individual workers.
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The outcome, by putting the foremen in charge of personnel man-
agement, merit-rating process, quality management and workplace
safety-management, has been to weaken union delegates’ inﬂu-
ence among fellow workers (KILSP: 195). Under the supervision
of the foremen, every team has to compete with each other for
monthly evaluation, the results of which are publicized and can
give the workers either awards or disciplinary punishments. The
promotion system, which was ﬁrmly based on seniority, has now
changed into an examination-based system under which anyone
who has been working for minimum duration in a certain position
can be given the opportunity to do an exam and get promoted
(Interview with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.2, 21 June 2002).
The increasing introduction of the piece-rate scheme also insti-
gates more competition among workers, increasing real working
hours almost without limit. If willing to, one could work 361 days
per year and earned the whole package of the piece rate.
Furthermore, increasing competition among workers appears not
only at the workplace but also within the communities in which
workers’ families live. Many informal mutual assistance commu-
nities in Hyundai Motors Car have now broken down (Interview
with Hyundai Motors Workers, no.1, 19 June 2002). The result is
that after a two-year period of structural adjustment based on the
ﬂexibility of work, labour relations in the workplace are now
undergoing signiﬁcant changes, most likely in favour of manage-
ment in HMC. More ﬂexibility and irregularization of labour are
likely to undermine the union’s power at the workplace further 
by forcing individual workers to compete with each other, rather
than allowing them to unite for survival, removing the basis of
workers’ militancy in Hyundai Motors Car. 
The case of Hyundai clearly shows the nature of the difﬁcul-
ties that the Korean labour movement faces. Labour regulation
now does not simply aim to smash the collective power of labour
through raw suppressive methods as it had before; rather, the new
forms of labour control aim to subordinate individual workers to
management by ﬂexible measures. The changing nature of labour
relations in Korea in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997
can be captured in the increasing marketization of labour control.
This process involves mainly 1) the so-called ﬂexibility of the
labour market on the basis of the growing job insecurity and
increasing number of the irregular form of employment; 2) new
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human resource management methods on the basis of more com-
petition-based personnel management and a capability-based
wage system; and 3) the restructuring of workplace organization. 
The Nature of the Changes in Labour Relations in Korea 
Marketized Labour Control
After the institutional restructuring of the labour market, job
security, which had been relatively well managed by the protec-
tion of the militant enterprise trade unions and the long-term
“miraculous” accumulation that had guaranteed almost full
employment for thirty years, began to be eroded. In addition to the
job losses in insolvent ﬁrms, over 2,000,000 jobs, by lay-offs and
its disguised form, voluntary retirement, have disappeared since
1998. By the end of 1998, according to Korean Businessmen
Federation’s research on employment adjustment in 192 ﬁrms
employing more than 100 workers, about half of them have
reduced workforces through honorary retirement, lay-off and out-
sourcing since the economic crisis (Samsung Economic Institute:
156). This increasing implementation of numeric employment
adjustment results not merely from temporary economic recession,
but from a more fundamental restructuring of the labour market.
Hence, even though the Korean economy recovered from the
economic crisis, the measures of numeric employment adjustment
have continued. 
Although the unemployment rate, which at the peak reached
8.4%, has decreased continually since early 1999, the fall is not
based on the creation of new full and permanent employment, but
on the massive “irregularization of employment”. Irregularization
of employment is evidenced by the increasing number of tempo-
rary and daily-contracted workers after the crisis and following
labour law reforms. In 1999, temporary and daily-contracted
workers accounted for more than half of total employees while
“the proportion of regular workers fell from 34% of all workers in
1997 to 30% in 1999” (OECD: 191). However, the increase in
temporary and daily-contracted workers cannot fully reﬂect the
irregularization of employment as this does not include the
increasing number of dispatched and in-company-subcontract
workers, as we saw in Hyundai’s case, who are also in unstable
employment. There are about 800,000 workers who now belong
to these forms of employment (Joint Committee for Abolishing
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Dispatched Labour: 2). The renewal of the employment contract
of dispatched workers depends on the renewal of contracts
between the agencies and companies and again between the
agencies and workers, while that of in-company-subcontract
employment relies on the renewal of the contract between the
ordering companies and subcontract companies. Due to the
indirect-nature of the reproduction of their employment, these
workers are more vulnerable to managerial authorities and the
growing insecurity of employment. 
Flexible Measures and Personnel Management 
The marketized labour control is accompanied by wage
adjustment, which is represented by the “conversion from a
seniority-based to a capability-based system” (Kim and Yoo: 166).
Amongst many ﬂexible wage systems, annual salary systems have
rapidly spread, especially among large-scale companies, in the
aftermath of the crisis. According to the Ministry of Labour, an
annual salary system has been introduced in 932 ﬁrms since
January 2000, involving 23 per cent of 4,052 companies employ-
ing more than 100 full time workers and showing a large increase
from the 94 ﬁrms in 1996’s survey (Kim and Yoo: 26). Also the
performance-based system, including piece-rate, proﬁt-sharing
and stock options, has been introduced after the crisis. Since wage
increases through collective bargaining have been minimal in the
aftermath of the crisis and the piece-rate has been higher than any
wage increase achieved through collective bargaining, the capa-
bility-based wage system has been increasingly accepted by
workers.
Personnel management, which relied merely on disciplinary
action, is now being changed into an indirect and more scientiﬁc
management, particularly in the large chaebols. While merit-based
promotion systems are replacing service-year-based promotion
systems, the measures of merit rating have also become more
sophisticated in various ways. In many ﬁrms, individual merit is
now rated mainly in terms of performance, recorded participation
in education programs and the acceptance of speciﬁc behavioural
norms. Those standards are further divided into several sub-terms
such as rates of diligence and indolence, the quality of goods
produced by individual producers (with the introduction of a “real
name quality system”), the quality of suggestions by the workers
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to enhance production, the speed at which an operator works and
the extent to which they maintain public order. Management pub-
licizes the monthly and yearly evaluation scores of individuals and
teams and supplies appropriate rewards and punishments. In the
public sector, a team-performance-based system has also been
increasingly introduced together with an “independent operation
division system” within which each of the enterprise departments
is managed and evaluated independently in accordance with its
own performance (KILSP: 91-92). 
Authoritarian Control Over the Flexible Labour Market
It is true that there has been a signiﬁcant transformation in
labour control from the traditional system, based only on the
authoritarian relations between managers and worker and the
state’s control over collective labour, to a system based on the so-
called ﬂexible operation of the labour market. However, the more
recent re-deployment of authoritarian methods by the state to
enforce the institutionalization of a ﬂexible labour market ques-
tions the one-sided capturing of the nature of the transition. In the
immediate aftermath of the crisis, the newly elected Kim Dae-
jung government seemed, rather than merely relying on the tradi-
tional methods, to look for a social consensus by integrating the
outlawed democratic union movement into the newly launched
Tripartite Commission in which unions, management and govern-
ment discussed not only labour policies and a social safety net, but
also corporate, ﬁnancial and public sector structural adjustment as
a whole. Indeed, it is true that the union’s legal status has been
enhanced to a great degree by allowing unions to engage in polit-
ical activity, plural unionism at the national level and recognition
of the KCTU. 
However, it was after the controversial “February Agreement”
of the Tripartite Committee, in which the unions agreed with the
necessity of the restructuring of the labour market, that the state
again began to intervene directly in labour disputes that could
possibly fracture the smooth operation of the labour market. Since
then, showing a critical return to authoritarian control over labour,
the state’s labour policies have emphasized that the ﬂexible labour
market should be operating, at any cost, without disturbance by
unions and that the struggle against structural adjustment can be 
a matter of “discussion” but cannot be a matter of “struggle”,
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declaring that strikes related with structural adjustment are all
illegal.9 As seen in the Mando Machinery, Daewoo Motors Car,
and Lotte Hotel Workers’ strike, the state intervenes in labour con-
ﬂicts to an extent far greater than mere regulation of the labour
market. 
Conclusion 
Korean labour relations, after a decade of transition, have been
reformulated ﬁnally in the aftermath of the economic crisis in
1997. Unions, after a long period of struggles for legal recogni-
tion since the liberation in 1945, have ﬁnally achieved their goal.
However, this has been won at the expense of imposing a great
degree of job insecurity on individual workers through the so-
called ﬂexibility of the labour market. However, it is naïve to
expect that the transformation of Korea’s economic development
on the basis of the ﬂexibility of labour will be smooth. The shift
in labour relations on the basis of this principle has already
revealed its negative consequences in various ways. Working
hours, which had continually shortened since 1986, have increased
from 207 hours per month in 1997 to 226 hours per month by late
1999, almost returning to working hours in 1989. Real wage
increase has also slowed down, even showing a 9% real wage
decrease in 1998. Increasing competition among workers has also
increased the intensity of labour. According to the KCTU, over 70
per cent of workers experienced an increase in the intensity of
labour after the economic crisis (Kang: 85). The growing re-
deployment of authoritarian rule, together with worsening
working conditions, decreasing real wages and, most of all, fast
growing number of irregular workers, is likely to provoke further
resistance of marginalized workers. The number of strikes began
to increase again after 1998, accompanying an increase in the
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9 The February Agreement, which says “we will do our best in order to avoid lay-
offs and management should…consult with the representatives of workers about the
measures taken to avoid lay-offs”, has been seriously abused in the sense that the
employers’ attempt to minimize was interpreted as “optional” whereas the unions,
although they can discuss that matter beforehand, have to accept employers’ deci-
sions (For a summary of the February Agreement, see OECD: 49). Since, according
to the government’s interpretation, structural adjustment cannot be subjected to col-
lective action and strikes caused by disagreement on the adjustment measures are a
violation against employers’ rights, they are therefore illegal.
number of workers involved in single cases. While “established”
trade unions in large ﬁrms tend to compromise workers’ interests
with managerial needs through concession bargaining, there are
increasing attempts to organize non-militant workers, such as
irregular workers and workers in the public sector, casting doubt
as to the peaceful nature of transformation. The future of Korean
labour relations relies on how much these new attempts can revi-
talize the strength of the workers’ movement at the workplace. If
they can create solidarity-based struggles, overcoming the
growing conﬂicts and competition between individual workers,
the new form of labour relations will go through another moment
of transition. 
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